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 One purpose of the individual mandate is to elim-
inate the market for self-insured healthcare trans-
actions. It is well-established in this Court’s precedent 
that the elimination of an interstate commercial 
market is a constitutionally legitimate end for Con-
gress to pursue under the Commerce Clause. Under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may use 
any reasonably adapted means to accomplish con-
stitutionally legitimate ends. The individual mandate 
is not only reasonably adapted but is quite elegant as 
a means of eliminating the market for self-insured 
healthcare transactions. The provision effectively en-
courages individuals to shift from the inefficient 
market for self-insured care to its more efficient sub-
stitute market for fully-insured care. 
 The question presented is whether the minimum 
coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
powers under Article I of the Constitution. 
ii 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Prescription Policy Choices is a nonprofit 
educational and public policy organization providing 
objective research and expertise on prescription drug 
policy. Our mission is to serve as an independent 
voice in educating and providing advocacy services to 
stakeholders and consumers on issues relating to ac-
cess to safe, effective, and affordable prescription 
drugs in the U.S. The Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) will further our goal to effectively 
reduce prescription drug prices and increase access to 
medications and comprehensive health care. 
 Professors of Law and Professors of Health 
Policy are experts in the fields with particular 
interest in this case. The professors supporting this 
brief, with their student research assistants, include: 
Paula Berg, J.D., Professor of Law, City University 
of New York Law School; Alexander Capron, LL.B., 
Scott H. Bice Chair in Health Law, Policy and Ethics, 
Gould School of Law, Professor of Law and Medicine, 
Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern Cal-
ifornia; Alan B. Cohen, Sc.D., Professor of Health 
Policy and Management, Boston University School 
of Management; Marsha Garrison, J.D., Suzanne J. 
& Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law 
 
 1 This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as 
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule 
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole 
or in part by counsel for any party. Expenses of amici have been 
borne by their own resources, without support from any party. 
2 
School; Jesse A. Goldner, J.D., M.A., John D. Valen-
tine Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School 
of Law; Seema Mohapatra, J.D., M.P.H., Assistant 
Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas 
School of Law; Kevin Outterson, J.D., LL.M., Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Boston University School of 
Law; Katrina Angela Pagonis, J.D., M.P.H., LL.M., 
Assistant Professor of Law, Hamline University 
School of Law; Daniel G. Partan, LL.M., LL.B., 
Professor of Law Emeritus, Boston University School 
of Law; Robert D. Sloane, J.D., Associate Professor 
of Law, Boston University School of Law; Kyle 
Thomson, M.P.H., J.D. expected 2012, Boston Uni-
versity School of Law; David J. Arnold, J.D. ex-
pected 2012, Boston University School of Law; Julia 
Grace Mirabella, J.D. expected 2012, Boston Uni-
versity School of Law; Hao Wang, J.D. expected 
2012, Boston University School of Law. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The Eleventh Circuit and the parties failed to 
identify one of Congress’s most important goals in 
passing the individual mandate: eliminating the 
market for self-insured healthcare transactions. The 
parties have considered only Congress’s goals of cor-
recting adverse selection and reducing cost-shifting in 
the health insurance market, overlooking the addi-
tional goal of eliminating the market for self-insured 
care. 
3 
 Regardless of whether the individual mandate 
is a necessary or proper means of stimulating the 
market for health insurance, Congress’s goal of elimi-
nating the self-insured market is undoubtedly a le-
gitimate exercise of congressional power, and the 
individual mandate is a reasonably adapted means 
of accomplishing that goal. Congress has well-
established authority to ban an interstate commercial 
market or otherwise to prohibit interstate commerce, 
as well as clear concomitant authority to accomplish 
such bans by penalizing intrastate behavior. Because 
the market for self-insured healthcare is a national 
market, Congress may try to eliminate it. 
 Furthermore, Congress chose an eminently ra-
tional and minimally intrusive means of accomplish-
ing its ban: a small financial incentive for individuals 
to choose fully-insured care over self-insured care, 
where fully-insured care is a sufficient substitute that 
is demonstrably more efficient. The market for self-
insured care is inefficient because individuals sys-
tematically underestimate their need to save for 
future medical care, due to proven tendencies to un-
derestimate personal health risks and to undervalue 
long-term healthcare costs. Insurance corrects these 
inefficiencies through payment structures that en-
courage patients to consume preventive care and that 
guarantee sufficient savings for future costs. Shifting 
individuals into the fully-insured market also intro-
duces other efficiencies that underscore the rational-
ity of Congress’s scheme. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS A RA-
TIONAL MEANS OF ELIMINATING THE IN-
TERSTATE MARKET FOR SELF-INSURED 
HEALTHCARE TRANSACTIONS. 
 Throughout this litigation, the parties and the 
courts have treated the individual mandate, 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A, of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, 
as amended by the Health Care and Education Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 
1029, as though its only goals are to combat adverse 
selection in the health insurance market and to re-
duce cost-shifting in the healthcare market. See 
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 
2011). So characterized, the mandate seems to raise a 
difficult question of whether Congress may require 
individual purchases in order to stimulate commerce.  
 But a different and equally valid characterization 
of the mandate presents a much easier – indeed, a 
well-settled – constitutional question: whether Con-
gress may regulate intrastate behavior not to stim-
ulate a market but to eliminate a market.2 One of 
 
 2 Petitioners raise issues related to inefficiencies of self-
insured healthcare transactions, and they recognize that Con-
gress may attempt to eliminate the entire self-insured market 
rather than penalizing only individuals who consume uncom-
pensated care. See Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Pro-
vision) at 43-44, 50-51, Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida 
(2012) (No. 11-398). We present a full constitutional and economic 
defense of Congress’s elimination goal and mandate strategy. 
5 
Congress’s most important goals in passing the in-
dividual mandate was not to improve the market for 
insurance but to eliminate the market for self-insured3 
healthcare,4 shifting individuals out of that market by 
requiring them to obtain insurance. Regardless of 
 
 3 We refer to the market for “self-insured” rather than “un-
insured” care because “uninsured” is both under-inclusive and 
over-inclusive of the problems Congress addressed. First, al-
though it is true that most self-insured individuals are under-
insured or uninsured for the care they need, even those with 
sufficient savings cause inefficiencies by paying out-of-pocket. 
Third-party insurance is more efficient than self-insurance for 
all consumers because insurers add bulk purchasing discounts, 
quality screening, and medical management. See Part II, infra. 
Congress therefore reasonably sought to eliminate the whole 
market for self-insured care, not just the market for uncompen-
sated care. Second, some uninsured transactions are unprob-
lematic but are not meaningfully “self-insured.” For example, 
elective surgeries (e.g. cosmetic surgery) and extra diagnostics 
(e.g. non-indicated mammography) are common healthcare pur-
chases that insurance rarely covers. But individuals needn’t be 
insured against healthcare costs that are neither medically 
necessary nor time-sensitive. Elective healthcare purchases are 
not “self-insured” any more than the patient’s last DVD pur-
chase was “self-insured.” Because these kinds of elective costs 
present few inefficiencies, Congress didn’t intend to eliminate 
the market for uninsured elective care that is bought and paid 
for. The target market, then, is for self-insured healthcare: 
healthcare that is medically necessary but lacks coverage by a 
third-party insurer. 
 4 Importantly, the market that Congress targeted is not the 
market for self-insurance itself – which is not a true market 
given that individuals don’t buy or sell anything to self-insure – 
but rather the market for self-insured healthcare transactions. 
Healthcare purchases have different characteristics when made 
without third-party insurance, sufficiently so that self-insured 
and fully-insured transactions constitute separate markets. 
6 
whether Congress’s goals of curing adverse selection 
and reducing cost-shifting are proper exercises of 
Congress’s powers, the additional goal of eliminating 
a national market in self-insured healthcare trans-
actions is clearly legitimate.  
 Furthermore, a small financial incentive for 
individuals to choose fully-insured5 healthcare over 
self-insured healthcare – where the two options are 
near-perfect substitutes – is an eminently rational 
and minimally intrusive means of accomplishing that 
goal. The individual mandate is therefore a rational 
means of achieving the constitutionally legitimate 
end of eliminating the market for self-insured health-
care. Even if the mandate is not necessary or proper 
as a means of stimulating the insurance market, its 
constitutionality as a means of eliminating the self-
insured market is sufficient to sustain the provision. 
We urge the Court to reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s 
holding to the contrary. 
 
A. Eliminating The Market for Self-Insured 
Care Was One of Congress’s Central 
Goals in Passing The Individual Man-
date.  
 According to Congress’s legislative findings, the 
purpose of the individual mandate is to regulate not 
 
 5 We use “fully-insured” as an antonym for “self-insured,” to 
refer to all those who carry third-party insurance. Fully-insured 
individuals, by this definition, have to pay applicable copayments 
and deductibles but are “fully-insured” in the sense that they 
are insured against most conceivable healthcare-related losses. 
7 
only “when health insurance is purchased” but also 
“how and when health care is paid for.” 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(A). Although some of Congress’s find-
ings address only adverse selection or cost-shifting, 
four of the ten findings speak to an additional goal of 
eliminating the market for self-insured care.  
 First, Congress asserted in two findings that the 
individual mandate would “increase the number and 
share of Americans who are insured,” 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(C), and would achieve “near-universal 
coverage,” § 18091(a)(2)(D). The next finding noted 
that “[t]he economy loses up to $207[ billion] a year 
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of 
the uninsured” and that near-universal coverage “will 
significantly reduce this economic cost.” 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(E). Even without the explicit acknowl-
edgement in § 18091(a)(2)(E) that Congress’s goal is 
to eliminate self-insurance, the stated goal of near-
universal coverage in §§ 18091(a)(2)(C)-(D) supports 
the notion that Congress sought to eliminate the self-
insured market. Universality is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to avoid last-minute enrollments in particu-
lar insurance pools (adverse selection), and cost 
sharing depends on the health and wealth character-
istics of the individuals in a given pool, not on the 
absolute number of people carrying insurance or on 
the percentage of the national population carrying 
insurance. Indeed, merely increasing the “number 
and share of Americans” participating in the insur-
ance market accomplishes very little for the efficiency 
of that market, particularly when the market is 
8 
structured such that individuals can move among 
discrete insurance pools. The virtue of universal 
coverage, then, rests in the notion that near-universal 
insurance definitionally decreases – almost to the 
point of elimination – the market for self-insured 
care.6 As the self-insured procure insurance, the mar-
ket for medically necessary care purchased without 
third-party coverage will dwindle until it is virtually 
nonexistent. Congress made this point explicit in 
§ 18091(a)(2)(E) by highlighting the overall cost of 
inefficiencies in the self-insured market and noting 
that the individual mandate sought to reduce that 
cost by reducing the market. 
 In the fourth relevant finding, Congress wrote: 
“62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in 
part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing 
health insurance coverage, the [individual mandate] 
requirement . . . will improve financial security for 
families.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G). This finding 
relates exclusively to the inefficiencies of the market 
for self-insured care – the problem that self-insured 
individuals frequently save too little to pay for the 
care that they inevitably consume. Furthermore, Con-
gress made explicit here its conclusion that shifting 
individuals into the near-perfect substitute market 
for fully-insured care would solve the inefficiency of 
 
 6 Fully-insured individuals are free to spend out-of-pocket 
money on healthcare, but patients making that choice are not 
“self-insured.” They have third-party insurance available for any 
healthcare they need. 
9 
insufficient savings. That is, Congress found that in-
dividuals who attempt to self-insure save too little to 
cover their medical expenses, and the legislature 
concluded that incentivizing individuals to shift to 
the market for fully-insured care would successfully 
eliminate the unstable market for self-insured care. 
 In short, in addition to the goals that the Elev-
enth Circuit and the parties identify of curing ineffi-
ciencies in the insurance market, one of Congress’s 
goals with the individual mandate was to eliminate 
the alternative but less efficient market for self-
insured healthcare. The mandate accomplishes that 
goal by creating an incentive for individuals to shift 
from the self-insured market to the fully-insured 
market, on the theory that rational consumers would 
rather spend their money on insurance coverage than 
on the equivalently costly “shared responsibility pay-
ment” that leaves them self-insured. See 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(b). 
 
B. Eliminating the National Market for 
Self-Insured Care is a Legitimate Exer-
cise of Congress’s Article I Power to 
Regulate Interstate Commerce. 
 When characterized as an attempt to stimulate 
the insurance market, the individual mandate raises 
potentially difficult questions about the limits of Con-
gress’s powers, including the now-infamous question 
of whether Congress may require individuals to buy 
broccoli in order to stimulate the vegetable market. 
10 
But Congress’s goal of eliminating the market in self-
insured care presents a much easier question with 
virtually no “slippery slope” implications. Congress 
has well-established authority to ban an interstate 
commercial market – as well as clear concomitant 
authority to accomplish such bans by penalizing 
purely intrastate behavior.7 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (mari-
juana); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (low-wage workers); United 
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (unapproved 
pharmaceuticals); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146 (1971) (extortionate credit transactions); Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (excess wheat); United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (low-wage 
employees). Indeed, this Court has explicitly held 
that Congress’s commerce authority “extends not only 
to those regulations which aid, foster and protect the 
commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it.” 
Darby, 312 U.S. at 113. 
 Under this Court’s precedents, then, Congress’s 
authority to eliminate markets has no constitutional 
limits beyond those in the Bill of Rights (which 
protects discrete markets, such as speech-related 
 
 7 Notwithstanding its holding below, the Eleventh Circuit 
has explicitly acknowledged this authority. See United States v. 
Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, where 
Congress has attempted to regulate (or eliminate) an interstate 
market, Raich grants Congress substantial leeway to regulate 
purely intrastate activity (whether economic or not). . . .”) (em-
phasis added). 
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markets). But a limitless constitutional power to 
prohibit commerce has never been thought particu-
larly troubling because there are such strong political 
checks against excessive bans. Imagine, for example, 
that Congress passed a purchase mandate for broccoli 
in an effort to ban the markets for all other foods, at-
tempting to channel consumption to the legislatively-
dictated healthiest nutrition source. Or imagine that 
Congress passed a purchase mandate for American-
made cars in an attempt to ban the markets for 
foreign automobiles. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. 
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (analogizing the insur-
ance mandate to a broccoli mandate and a GM car 
mandate), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Flor-
ida, 648 F.3d 1235. Any admission on Congress’s part 
that it sought to eliminate the markets for donuts or 
BMWs would cause tremendous political backlash, 
far more so than a stated goal of stimulating the 
markets for broccoli and Chevrolets. Importantly, this 
is not to say that political constraints are sufficient to 
enforce constitutional limits nor that constitutional 
limits are defined by political constraints. Cf. United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000) (noting 
that “the limitation of congressional authority is not 
solely a matter of legislative grace”). It is rather to 
say that this Court’s long tradition of finding no 
constitutional limit on Congress’s power to prohibit 
interstate commerce should not be worrying. Con-
gress has clear and unbounded authority to eliminate 
any interstate commercial market, at least so long as 
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that market lacks substantive protection under the 
Bill of Rights. 
 Given this clear authority, the first question for 
the individual mandate ought to be whether the mar-
ket for self-insured healthcare is, in fact, an inter-
state market over which the federal government has 
jurisdiction. Because the inputs and outputs into self-
insured healthcare travel across state lines, because 
Congress has a long history of regulating the market 
for self-insured care, and because federalism doctrine 
and theory support federal jurisdiction in this con-
text, the answer is clearly yes. 
 First, the inputs and outputs of the market for 
self-insured care travel interstate. Inputs, including 
prescription drugs, medical devices, and medical ser-
vices, are all provided through interstate commerce. A 
doctor in Massachusetts may prescribe pills made in 
Illinois, use a syringe manufactured in New York, or 
take a continuing medical education course in Mary-
land. Decisions by a doctor in one state will therefore 
affect the availability and prices of those inputs in 
another. The outputs from the market for self-insured 
care are patients. These patients also regularly travel 
across state lines. Indeed, patients frequently travel 
interstate for the purpose of obtaining care, but even 
outside of a purely medical context, self-insured 
individuals regularly travel interstate, carrying with 
them some risk that they will experience a medical 
emergency requiring immediate care. Furthermore, 
individuals born in one state might not stay there 
forever, and a patient’s long-term health status that 
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arose in one state will travel to future states, impact-
ing the future states’ healthcare infrastructures. As-
suming, then, that self-insured care is less efficient 
than fully-insured care – assuming Congress is right 
that self-insured patients negatively impact input 
prices and output qualities – those effects will not be 
state-specific. Massachusetts’s success in reducing its 
own market for self-insured care will not proportion-
ally reduce the negative effects Massachusetts expe-
riences from self-insurance because some of those 
negative effects will continue to seep in from other 
states’ self-insured markets. The individual mandate 
thus clearly targets an interstate commercial market, 
not just intrastate decisions. 
 Second, Congress has a long history of regulatory 
involvement in the healthcare market, which includes 
a long history of prohibiting commerce in medical 
commodities. See, e.g., Women’s Health and Cancer 
Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 902, 112 
Stat. 2681 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 
101 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in 
42 U.S.C.); Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); Old-Age, Survivors, and Dis-
ability Insurance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–97, 79 
Stat. 286 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.) (estab-
lishing Medicare); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938 (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 
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(codified as amended in 21 U.S.C.). The Eleventh 
Circuit’s apparent holding that Congress may not at-
tempt to prohibit self-insured healthcare would, if 
adopted by this Court, require disruption of many 
deeply entrenched federal regulations. 
 Finally, federalism theory and doctrine support 
federal rather than state authority over a ban on self-
insured care. Individual states face difficult chal-
lenges in regulating their own healthcare markets, 
including legal obstacles that this Court has specifi-
cally upheld, such as preemption under ERISA, see 
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), and 
under the FDCA, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 
U.S. 312 (2008). Furthermore, the mobility of the 
citizenry and the reality of interstate competition 
create practical obstacles for state regulation. States 
that have implemented insurance regulations, for ex-
ample, have found that insurers flee the state rather 
than adapting to regulation, making the regulations 
almost entirely ineffective. Conrad F. Meier, Council 
for Affordable Health Insurance, Destroying Insur-
ance Markets: How Guaranteed Issue and Community 
Rating Destroyed the Individual Health Insurance 
Market in Eight States (2005). Furthermore, states 
can free-ride on their neighbors’ reforms. For exam-
ple, now that Massachusetts has nearly eliminated its 
market for self-insured care, strengthening its own 
healthcare infrastructure, residents of New Hampshire 
can simply use the better Massachusetts healthcare 
environment rather than banning New Hampshire’s 
self-insured market. See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff 
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& Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in 
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of 
the ACA, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 266 (2011). 
 The Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that health-
care and insurance regulation have historically fallen 
within the states’ police power, Florida, 648 F.3d at 
1305-06, but outright bans of commodities and enter-
prises – even those that relate to traditional police 
power regimes like health – have never been consid-
ered exclusive state realms. See generally Kevin 
Outterson, Health Care, Technology and Federalism, 
103 W. Va. L. Rev. 503 (2001). The elimination of any 
nationwide market is necessarily a regulation of com-
merce among the several states, falling squarely with-
in Congress’s enumerated authority. U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3. States have no claim to that power. See 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1962 
(2010). Because the market for self-insured health-
care is an interstate commercial market, elimination 
of that market is unquestionably a permissible end 
under Congress’s Article I powers. The individual 
mandate therefore should be upheld so long as the 
provision is a rational means of accomplishing that 
end. 
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C. The Individual Mandate is a Rational, 
Permissible, and Reasonably Adapted 
Means of Eliminating the Self-Insured 
Healthcare Market. 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 
18, grants Congress “broad power to enact laws that 
are convenient, or useful or conducive” to the benefi-
cial exercise of an enumerated power. Comstock, 
supra, at 1956 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In describing the scope of this authority, Justice 
Marshall famously stated: “Let the end be legitimate, 
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 421 (1819). The Court thus looks for means-ends 
rationality in conducting a Necessary and Proper 
analysis. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 
(2004) (citing generally McCulloch). The “relevant 
question is simply whether the means chosen are 
‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate 
end under the commerce power.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. 
at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Darby, 312 U.S. 
at 121). The question here is whether the individual 
mandate is “reasonably adapted” to Congress’s goal of 
eliminating the market for self-insured healthcare. 
There is no doubt that it is. 
 The individual mandate will make the market for 
self-insured care significantly less attractive, chan-
neling consumers to the obvious substitute market for 
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fully-insured care. The mandate requires all able in-
dividuals to spend a fixed amount of money each year 
on supporting the healthcare infrastructure, either by 
purchasing a private insurance contract or by making 
an equal or lesser “shared responsibility payment” 
to the national treasury. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b); 
§ 5000A(c)(1) (capping the penalty at the cost of 
bronze-level insurance). Given the choice between 
giving money to a third-party insurer for the benefits 
of coverage and giving the same money to the gov-
ernment for no direct benefit at all, the vast majority 
of consumers will likely prefer to acquire insurance. 
As more consumers make the rational choice to pur-
chase insurance, the market for self-insured health-
care will disappear. In short, because fully-insured 
healthcare is nearly a perfect substitute for self-
insured healthcare (with limited exceptions for medi-
cally necessary care that the third-party insurer does 
not cover and for small copayments or deductibles 
that the patient must cover), a patient who has 
bought third-party insurance has definitionally left 
the market for self-insured care. The individual man-
date is thus an elegant means of eliminating the in-
efficient self-insured market. 
 Of course, there are other approaches that Con-
gress could take to eliminating the self-insured 
market. These approaches would be clearly constitu-
tional, but they would be equally infringing of liberty, 
equally implicative of a federal police power, see 
Florida, 648 F.3d at 1309, and more problematic for 
various policy reasons. Because of these unfavorable 
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policy implications, the individual mandate is more 
“reasonably adapted” to Congress’s goal than its al-
ternatives.  
 One alternative to the individual mandate would 
be to repeal the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
Enacted in 1986, EMTALA requires hospitals that 
accept Medicare reimbursement and that operate 
trauma centers to provide care to anyone who re-
quires emergency medical attention, regardless of his 
ability to pay. Id. Repealing EMTALA would allow 
hospitals to refuse emergency care to the self-insured, 
even when the self-insured truly require emergent 
interventions. Individuals would then have a strong 
incentive to move from the self-insured market to the 
fully-insured market in order to guarantee that they 
would receive treatment when needed. The problem, 
of course, is that repealing EMTALA would allow 
hospitals to screen for insurance before providing 
emergency care, potentially delaying lifesaving 
treatments even for the fully-insured. Furthermore, 
insured individuals who forgot their insurance cards 
or whose wallets could not be found after an accident 
might be rejected for treatment. This is clearly un-
desirable policy. 
 Another possible and clearly constitutional 
means of eliminating a market for self-insured care 
would be to punish the consumption of such care. 
That is, Congress could require the self-insured to 
pay an additional fee to the government – a pen- 
alty for self-insurance – whenever they consume 
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healthcare without third-party insurance. This method 
of banning self-insurance, however, would be ex-
tremely impractical; individuals who can’t afford to 
pay for care in the first place and who are filing for 
bankruptcy because of their medical bills would not 
be able to pay the penalty. See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(G). The punishment would therefore be 
ineffective absent a return to debtors’ prisons – which 
would be far more infringing of liberty than the 
individual mandate. Furthermore, a consumption 
penalty would be no less implicative of liberty inter-
ests or of a federal police power than the individual 
mandate. Because all individuals will one day need 
healthcare, the consumption penalty would be equally 
unavoidable. In the end, a punishment that triggers 
upon consumption of self-insured care would be less 
rational than the individual mandate, and it would be 
equally anti-libertarian. See also Br. of Pet. at 43-44 
(supporting the idea that Congress need not target 
only those patients who consume uncompensated 
care). 
 One final constitutional alternative to the indi-
vidual mandate would be to provide mandatory public 
insurance, like “Medicare For All,” which would serve 
an identical function to the individual mandate by 
compulsorily shifting individuals into a substitute for 
self-insured healthcare. See United States National 
Health Care Act, H.R. 676, 111th Cong. (2009). Medi-
care is constitutional, see Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act on logic 
that supports the constitutionality of Medicare), and 
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expanding the program would not raise any addition-
al constitutional concerns, see Adam Liptak, Some 
Common Ground for Legal Adversaries on Health 
Care, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2011, at A16 (noting that 
both sides of the fight over the ACA agree that Medi-
care For All would be constitutional). A single-payer 
program, though, would be more infringing of liberty 
and more implicative of a federal police power than 
the individual mandate. The mandate allows Ameri-
cans to choose among many insurance options, and 
the ACA allows states to retain primacy over health 
insurance licensure, insurance exchange design, and 
enforcement of ACA regulations. Traditional Medi-
care, by contrast, creates a single insurance pool in 
which all elderly Americans must participate and 
over which states have virtually no influence. Medi-
care might well be better than private insurance – 
which might be why one protester infamously com-
manded Representative Robert Inglis to “keep your 
government hands off my Medicare,” see Phillip 
Rucker, Sen. DeMint of S.C. is Voice of Opposition to 
Health-Care Reform, Wash. Post, July 28, 2009, at A4 
– but the program is certainly more centralized and 
less libertarian than the individual mandate. 
 
II. THE MARKET FOR SELF-INSURED CARE 
IS, IN FACT, LESS EFFICIENT THAN THE 
MARKET FOR FULLY-INSURED CARE. 
 Congress’s attempt to eliminate the market for 
self-insured healthcare is rational given the proven 
economic inefficiencies in the market for self-insured 
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care, such as optimism bias and hyperbolic discount-
ing, which lead patients to under-consume preventive 
care, over-consume catastrophic care, and under-save 
for future care. The market for fully-insured care cor-
rects these inefficiencies through carefully designed 
cost-sharing structures, and insurance definitionally 
guarantees that patients are saving sufficiently for 
future costs. Insurance also adds its own efficiencies 
to the healthcare market by negotiating volume dis-
counts, providing quality assurances, and engaging in 
medical management. Congress had these benefits 
in mind when it chose to shift patients from self-
insurance to full-insurance. Of course, many voters – 
and perhaps many judges and justices – might have 
chosen a different approach to curing these problems, 
but the standard for constitutionality is only whether 
Congress had a rational basis for making the choice it 
did. Given the economies of healthcare and insurance, 
Congress’s decision is clearly rational. 
 
A. The Market for Self-Insured Healthcare 
Transactions is Inefficient. 
 Due to two proven cognitive failures, individuals 
systematically underestimate their need to save for 
future medical care. First, individuals underestimate 
their personal risks for bad health outcomes, and 
second, individuals undervalue long-term costs rela-
tive to short-term costs. As a result, patients forgo the 
immediate costs associated with living a healthy 
lifestyle and receiving preventive care while simulta-
neously saving too little to pay for future care. These 
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habits lead individuals to consume inefficient medical 
services such as emergent care and to over-consume 
catastrophic care relative to their ability to pay.  
 
1. Individuals underestimate their per-
sonal risks for bad health outcomes. 
 One of the reasons that Congress wants to elimi-
nate self-insurance is that individuals who self-insure 
systematically under-invest in healthcare savings due 
to a cognitive failure known as “optimism bias.” 
Optimism bias describes a patient’s proven tendency 
to be unrealistic about her vulnerability to bad 
health. See Neil D. Weinstein, Reducing Unrealistic 
Optimism About Illness Susceptibility, 2 Health 
Psychol. 11, 11-12 (1983); Neil D. Weinstein & William 
M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to 
Debiasing Interventions, 14 Health Psychol. 132, 132 
(1995). It is an unfortunate statistical truth that not 
every individual in a given group can have below 
average risk for health complications. Patients, 
however, systematically underestimate their relative 
susceptibility to such complications, in part because 
they lack complete information about population 
characteristics and in part because they cognitively 
overemphasize their positive risk factors while under-
emphasizing their negative risk factors. Weinstein, 
Reducing Unrealistic Optimism, supra, at 12. Be-
cause of the inherent egocentrism involved in self-
assessments of risk, a patient can lose sight of the 
fact that a majority of people share her positive risk 
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factors, overrating the effect those factors might have 
on her health outcomes. Id. at 18. 
 Importantly, optimism bias is not a matter of 
ignorance. Studies consistently show that even when 
risk information is effectively delivered to a patient 
that has greater than average risk factors for particu-
lar health problems, she does not change her behav-
ior. See, e.g., Weinstein & Klein, supra (describing 
multiple studies where education was ineffective in 
reducing individuals’ tendency to overrate their 
susceptibility to illness). This systematic failure to 
take account of personal risk factors causes all pa-
tients to under-invest in protections against poor 
health outcomes, such as by making healthy choices 
and seeking preventive care. It also leads to under-
estimation of future health costs, leaving the patient 
unprepared to pay for the full costs of the health- 
care she ultimately needs. Optimism bias is a well-
established market failure that causes significant 
inefficiencies in the market for self-insured health-
care. Whether or not the individual mandate is con-
stitutional as an attempt to combat adverse selection, 
it ought to be upheld as a rational attempt to steer 
individuals away from their tendency to under-invest 
in healthcare savings. 
 
2. Individuals undervalue long-term 
costs relative to short-term costs. 
 Another cause of individual under-investment in 
healthcare savings – and another market failure that 
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justifies Congress’s attempt to eliminate the market 
for self-insured care – is a cognitive bias known as 
hyperbolic discounting. In theory, a patient should 
refrain from engaging in an activity today if the long-
term costs, in today’s dollars, will outweigh the 
immediate benefits. In practice, however, patients 
frequently undervalue the present value of their 
actions because they underestimate the magnitude of 
the ultimate harm, a cognitive failure known as 
hyperbolic discounting.8 See, e.g., Peter Fishburn & 
Ariel Rubenstein, Time Preference, 12 Int’l Econ. Rev. 
39 (1982); Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport & Joseph 
Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred From Decisions: An 
Experimental Study, 35 Management Science 270 
(1989).  
 
 8 While in theory a patient will discount at a constant rate 
over time, in practice individual preferences are inconsistent. 
See Gretchen Chapmen & Arthur Elstein, Valuing the Future: 
Temporal Discounting of Health and Money, 15 Med. Decision 
Making 373, 373 (1995). “[T]he relative marginal price of wait-
ing for rewards” declines as the time necessary to wait in-
creases. Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic 
Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201, 205 (1981). To take a mone-
tary example, while today one may prefer $100 three weeks from 
now to $50 a week from now, when the time comes to receive the 
$50 next week, she might reverse her preference, taking the $50 
rather than waiting the marginal two weeks. Chapman & 
Elstein, supra, at 374. The rate at which she values the money 
has thus increased as the time horizon has decreased. Id. Since 
the resulting discount factor is described by a hyperbolic rather 
than constant or exponential function, the phenomenon is 
known as “hyperbolic discounting.” Thaler, supra, at 374-75. 
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 For example, a patient might resolve to start a 
new diet tomorrow, but when faced with the prospect 
of actually beginning the next day, his preference will 
switch for the short-term reward of eating a donut. 
The farther in the future a cost or reward is, the more 
likely he will be to discount the value at a lower rate. 
The end result is that the patient discounts the 
future benefits of maintaining a healthy lifestyle 
more than he should because the benefits are hidden 
while the costs are immediate. This leads the patient 
to make time-inconsistent choices about whether to 
maintain a healthy lifestyle, whether to receive 
preventive care, and whether to save for future care. 
See generally Chapman & Elstein, supra note 6. On 
the other hand, when the patient gets sick, the bene-
fits of care are immediate and the long-term costs of 
healthcare inflation from over-consumption are less 
apparent, leading him to consume more healthcare 
than he potentially needs or can afford. 
 Like optimism bias, this market failure has been 
proven in patient behavior in numerous settings, and 
it provides a sufficient justification for Congress’s de-
cision to steer individuals away from self-insurance. 
   
26 
3. Optimism bias and hyperbolic dis-
counting lead to over-consumption 
of healthcare relative to what an 
individual can afford and over-
consumption of inefficient emergen-
cy care. 
 As a result of optimism bias and hyperbolic 
discounting, an uninsured patient under-consumes 
preventive care and fails to save enough to pay for 
future healthcare costs. See, for example, Families 
USA, Getting Less Care: The Uninsured With Chronic 
Health Conditions, Families USA 2 (2001) (showing 
that uninsured individuals with chronic conditions 
receive less preventive care than those with insur-
ance). These trends have a compounding effect be-
cause the patient’s under-consumption of preventive 
care leads to worse catastrophic events. For example, 
a patient that did not seek preventive care is unlikely 
to detect emerging health conditions such as heart 
failure and diabetes early enough to avoid them. The 
patient will also over-consume care when faced with a 
catastrophic event because she cannot see the long-
term costs of these expenditures relative to the short 
term cost of forgoing care. At the same time, when a 
catastrophic event occurs, the patient who has saved 
too little to pay for her future healthcare costs will be 
unable to afford medically necessary care such as 
bypass surgery and diabetic management. A recent 
report from the Department of Health and Human 
Services shows that the median savings for self-
insured families is only $20. Office of the Assistant 
Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, Office of Health 
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Policy, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Value of 
Health Insurance: Few of the Uninsured Have Ade-
quate Resources to Pay Potential Hospital Bills 
(2011). Over 58 percent of hospital stays result in 
bills of more than $10,000, so the median self-insured 
patient will not be able to pay for the services she 
receives at all. Id. Furthermore, as Congress found in 
its legislative findings, these problems lead to billions 
of dollars per year in uncompensated care, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F), and they also contribute to 
more than half of all personal bankruptcies filed each 
year, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G). 
 Another systematic inefficiency arises from these 
market failures: The self-insured patient’s reliance on 
emergency departments and trauma centers – two of 
the least efficient settings for healthcare delivery. By 
failing to receive preventive care, a patient is more 
likely to suffer a catastrophic event that requires 
emergent care. Failure to save for catastrophic events 
drives patients to emergency rooms rather than 
cheaper urgent care centers because emergency 
rooms are required as a condition of Medicare partic-
ipation to provide medically necessary treatment 
regardless of a patient’s ability to pay. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd. The increased cost of treatment in an emer-
gency room relative to an urgent care center adds 
even more to the over-consumption effects that arise 
from self-insurance, contributing significantly to the 
alarming rate of inflation in the healthcare sector. 
See generally Daniel Simonet, Cost Reduction Strate-
gies for Emergency Services: Insurance Role, Practice 
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Changes and Patients Accountability, 17 Health Care 
Analysis 1 (2009). 
 Over-consumption of healthcare by a self-insured 
patient may manifest in other ways as well. For 
example, self-insured patients likely contribute to 
greater costs in Medicare consumption and Social 
Security disability payments. Wilhelmine Miller, 
Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & Willard G. Manning, 
Covering the Uninsured: What Is It Worth?, Health 
Affairs W4-157 (Web Supp.) (2004). Because a patient 
abstains from receiving preventive care, she is more 
likely to need costly catastrophic care later in life, 
after she has joined Medicare. While these costs are 
difficult to quantify, the stress on the system is a 
direct result of inefficiencies in the market for self-
insured healthcare. 
 In short, the many failures in the market for self-
insured care combine to create a pathologically ineffi-
cient market that Congress may rationally seek to 
eliminate under its authority to regulate interstate 
commerce. The Eleventh Circuit and the parties have 
failed to consider Congress’s authority to eliminate an 
inefficient marketplace, but that authority provides a 
sufficient basis to uphold the individual mandate. 
Because it is difficult to target the market for self-
insured care directly, Congress enacted the individual 
mandate as a rational strategy to shift patients from 
that market to a near-perfect substitute market: the 
market for insured care. 
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B. Insurance Cures Many of the Self-
Insured Market’s Inefficiencies and Cre-
ates Additional Efficiencies, Making 
it an Attractive Substitute for Self-
Insurance. 
 Many of the inefficiencies in the self-insured 
market are corrected when a patient becomes part of 
an insurance pool. The health insurance market fixes 
optimism bias and hyperbolic discounting problems 
present in the self-insured market by creating incen-
tives for patients to obtain preventive care and to 
avoid emergency room care. Furthermore, the insur-
ance market provides a commitment mechanism to 
help patients pay for future healthcare costs and 
creates additional efficiencies by leveraging market 
power. Congress’s decision to channel patients from 
the market for self-insured care to the market for 
fully-insured care is therefore an eminently rational – 
indeed, quite an elegant – approach to the project of 
eliminating the market for self-insured healthcare. 
Insurance fixes all of the relevant problems. 
 
1. The insured market fixes the opti-
mism bias problems present in the 
self-insured market. 
 The insured market fixes optimism bias and 
hyperbolic discounting problems by providing incen-
tives for a patient to seek preventive care and by 
requiring mandatory savings and risk coverage.  
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 One of the primary ways that health insurance 
has historically corrected for the patient’s incon-
sistent time preferences is by making preventive care 
as cheap as possible, setting low or zero copays. See, 
e.g., BlueCross BlueShield of Illinois, Health Insur-
ance Plan Comparison Guide (2011). This strategy 
reduces the patient’s immediate cost of receiving 
preventive care, nudging the patient towards screen-
ing that can prevent larger medical problems in the 
future. For example, a patient is more likely to re-
ceive breast exams, cervical screenings, and influenza 
shots when the marginal costs are relatively low. 
Robert L. Kane, Paul E. Johnson, Robert J. Town & 
Mary Butler, A Structured Review of the Effect of 
Economic Incentives on Consumers’ Preventive Behav-
ior, 27 Am. J. Preventive Med. 327, 327 (2004). Fur-
thermore, when faced with the choice of a small 
copayment for a primary care visit or full cost for a 
specialist visit, the patient will be much more likely 
to choose the cheaper primary care physician. All 
of this logic underlies the ACA regulatory scheme, 
motivating Congress to prohibit copayments entirely 
for at least some preventive care. See ACA § 1501, 
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (prohibiting cost-sharing 
for preventive services that the Preventive Services 
Task Force, see id. at 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-4, finds to 
be successful in preventing health problems); id. at 
42 U.S.C.A. § 13951(a)(1) (same for Medicare).  
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 The insurance market further corrects for cogni-
tive failures by creating a payment structure that 
requires mandatory saving and risk coverage. The 
required monthly payments for health insurance act 
as a commitment mechanism, requiring a patient to 
commit money to her healthcare costs ahead of time 
and ensuring that she will have enough available for 
care when it becomes necessary. David Laibson, 
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. 
Econ. 443, 443-45 (1997). As discussed at length 
above, without such a structured payment plan, a 
patient will not save enough for her future costs. The 
insurance market, thus, provides clear corrections to 
the market failures for self-insured care, making 
Congress’s choice of an incentive to insure an elegant 
means of eliminating the market for self-insured 
transactions. 
 
2. Insurance reduces over-use of emer-
gency room facilities by charging 
high copays if the patient is not ad-
mitted to the hospital. 
 Just as insurance companies create incentives for 
primary and preventive care through copay design, so 
too do they correct for overuse of emergency depart-
ments by imposing higher copayments for emergency 
room visits that prove to be non-emergent. For exam-
ple, many insurance contracts charge a $50 copay for 
an emergency room visit that does not result in the 
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patient’s admission to the hospital but waive the 
copay if the patient is admitted. See, e.g., BlueCross 
BlueShield, Blue Care Elect Preferred (PPO) Sum-
mary of Benefits: 2011-2012 Massachusetts State 
Universities Student Blue Plan (2011). If the patient’s 
condition was truly emergent, then she has no copay, 
but if she was relying on the emergency room as a 
substitute for more efficient outpatient settings (like 
primary care offices or urgent care centers), she pays 
a hefty penalty. These financial incentives have been 
shown to reduce the number of emergency visits, 
correcting the uninsured market’s inefficiency. See 
generally Daniel Simonet, supra (showing a 40 per-
cent reduction in emergency room consultations from 
similar efforts). 
 Channeling a patient away from emergency 
rooms is beneficial not only to relieve over-burdened 
emergency rooms but also to allow patients to receive 
more efficient care. By seeing primary care physi-
cians instead of emergency departments, the patient 
becomes part of a health management program that 
provides disease management for chronic diseases 
and consistent oversight moving forward. Insurance 
thus provides a structured bundle of incentives to 
help individuals overcome their cognitive failures and 
resulting over-consumption. Congress’s preference for 
the insured market is therefore quite rational. 
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3. Beyond correcting for inefficiencies 
experienced in the self-insured mar-
ket, the insured market has addi-
tional efficiency advantages. 
 Although insurance provides clear corrections to 
the particular failures in the self-insured market, 
those discrete corrections are not the only advantages 
of insurance. The insurance market adds at least 
three additional efficiencies that make it even better 
as a substitute for self-insured care. Unlike the self-
insured market, the insured market is able to provide 
(1) negotiated volume discounts, (2) quality screening 
and assurance, and (3) medical management services 
such as medical necessity review. 
 First, the insurance market has been able to use 
patient volume as a bargaining chip in commercial 
market negotiations for discounts on physician pay-
ments, pharmaceutical prices, and hospital services. 
By contracting with pharmaceutical companies and 
health providers, insurance companies can agree to 
channel patients towards certain network providers 
or can threaten to exclude a provider from coverage 
under the insurance plan in an effort to receive price 
discounts. See Vivian Y. Wu, Managed Care’s Price 
Bargaining with Hospitals, 28 J. Health Econ. 350 
(2009). In other words, the insurance pool gives in-
surers collective bargaining power that can discipline 
healthcare inflation for insured patients.  
 A patient seeking care in the self-insured market, 
on the other hand, has no leverage to threaten or 
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incentivize providers to change their pricing struc-
ture. For example, a Department of Health and Hu-
man Services Report to the President from 2000 
found that cash payers paid on average 14.6 percent 
more for the 200 most commonly prescribed drugs 
than did patients in the insured market. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs., Report to the President: 
Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending and Prices 96 
(2000). The insurance market thus creates a clear 
efficiency in controlling costs relative to the self-
insured market. 
 Second, insurers provide quality screening and 
assurance that self-insured patients are incapable of 
providing for themselves. Congress was clearly cogni-
zant of this problem as the ACA includes a number of 
provisions designed to increase transparency in the 
healthcare market, allowing patients better access to 
information. See generally ACA Title VI (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). But 
these provisions alone are insufficient to correct for 
the fundamental problem a patient faces in attempt-
ing to aggregate and analyze information. Most of the 
time, a patient is unequipped to draw appropriate 
conclusions about the quality of the care she is receiv-
ing. She often lacks both understanding of and access 
to the kinds of information necessary to make an 
intelligent and appropriate decision about her care. 
See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the 
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 941 (1963). Health literacy, the “degree to which 
people have the capacity to obtain, process, and 
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understand basic health information and services 
needed to make appropriate health decisions,” is a 
difficult hurdle to overcome, and poor health literacy 
can result in a “worse health status, and a higher 
rate of hospitalization” for the patient. Ruth M. 
Parker, Scott C. Ratzan & Nicole Lurie, Health Liter-
acy: A Policy Challenge for Advancing High-Quality 
Health Care, 22 Health Aff. 147, 147 (2003). Fur-
thermore, even highly literate patients have a hard 
time drawing reliable conclusions about the quality of 
care they have received because causation is difficult 
to establish for many medical interventions. A patient 
who leaves the doctor feeling worse than she did 
before the encounter might have received poor quality 
care, or she might simply have been beyond help. 
Even patients with the highest possible health liter-
acy – such as doctors themselves, when treated – 
often have a hard time differentiating between those 
scenarios based on an individual encounter. Only 
through population data can health analysts draw 
somewhat reliable conclusions about the quality of 
doctors and hospitals. 
 Of course, health insurers have ready-made 
access to such data based on the experiences of their 
insured. Health insurers thus provide a solution to 
the health literacy barrier by leveraging their access 
to collective data and their expertise in analyzing 
healthcare outcomes to provide quality screening. By 
comparing data on doctor quality alongside infor-
mation about the risk factors of individual patients, 
insurers provide a more efficient mechanism for 
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assuring quality from health care providers, and they 
can channel their insured patients away from low-
quality providers by refusing to cover visits to low-
quality doctors and hospitals. See generally Abigail R. 
Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: 
Why (and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 
B.U. L. Rev. 2323 (2010). 
 Moreover, the same bargaining power that allows 
insurers to receive discounted rates on services will 
provide an incentive for physicians to keep their 
quality standards high. Along with patient chan-
neling, insurers may provide pay-for-performance in-
centives to physicians who demonstrate elevated 
performance relative to their peers. John W. Rowe, 
Pay-for-Performance and Accountability: Related 
Themes in Improving Health Care, 145 Annals Inter-
nal Med. 695, 697 (2006). This is also a point that 
Congress clearly had in mind; the ACA contemplates 
increased use of performance measures, enabling in-
surers to make better use of their bargaining power 
moving forward. See, e.g., ACA §§ 10326-27, 10329, 
10331-32 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.A.) (improving the physician quality report-
ing system and facilitating public reporting of physi-
cian performance results); see also Anne B. Claiborne, 
Julia R. Hesse & Daniel T. Roble, Legal Impediments 
to Implementing Value Based Purchasing Healthcare, 
35 Am. J.L. & Med. 442 (2009) (describing the legal 
barriers to implementing effective pay for perfor-
mance evaluation prior to the ACA). 
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 Third, many private insurers (though not all) 
provide medical management functions by engaging 
in medical necessity review and by serving as gate-
keepers for access to specialists, both of which can 
create efficiencies relative to the self-insured market. 
Medical necessity review creates those efficiencies by 
preventing a patient from over-consuming care rela-
tive to need. As described above, a self-insured pa-
tient often over-consumes health care services, both 
relative to what she can pay for and relative to what 
she needs to maintain her health. Furthermore, a 
patient’s physician sometimes drives costs by suggest-
ing more care than the patient needs, in order to cap-
ture greater profits. Because of the information asym-
metries between doctor and patient, patients can fall 
prey to physician-induced demand that drives health-
care inflation. Private insurers are better than indi-
vidual patients at reducing these over-consumption 
problems for three reasons. First, insurers’ ability to 
aggregate data means they are in the best position to 
assess the effectiveness of treatments, leading to the 
elimination of treatments that are unnecessary or 
dangerous to the patient. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. 
Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical 
Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637, 1667 (1992). 
Second, insurers are able to provide oversight of phy-
sicians whose “financial incentives are . . . a signifi-
cant determinant of treatment behavior,” using their 
bargaining power and their collective data to combat 
physician-induced demand. Id. at 1667. Finally, the 
insurer’s relationship to the patient places the in-
surer in a good position to make efficient decisions 
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regarding healthcare costs since insurers “operate in 
a marketplace that penalizes them for failing to bal-
ance the customers’ desire for cost containment with 
the desire for access to necessary medical services.” 
Id. at 1665. Although medical necessity review does 
not do a perfect job of combating physician-induced 
demand and although insurance can have a counter-
vailing moral hazard effect that causes patients to 
demand more care than they would if paying out-of-
pocket, insurers are certainly in a better position 
than self-insured patients to make smart decisions 
about the safety and necessity of a requested medical 
intervention. Besides, Congress’s decision to shift pa-
tients from a market in which they over-consume 
catastrophic and emergency care to a market in 
which moral hazard might cause them to over-con-
sume preventive and specialty care is a rational 
choice, particularly given the potentiality for medical 
necessity review to curb moral hazard effects. And 
rationality is all that is required for constitutionality. 
 Gatekeepers are less popular and less common 
than medical necessity review in the private insur-
ance market (and nonexistent in traditional Medi-
care), but they are similarly capable of creating 
efficiencies that are quite difficult for self-insured 
patients to capture. By channeling patients through 
primary care physicians before they see specialists, 
gatekeepers allow primary care physicians to manage 
patient flow, determine whether patients require non-
routine care, and avoid patient referral to a specialist 
for costly and redundant tests. Simonet, supra at 7-8. 
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Gatekeepers, thus, allow some patients who would 
otherwise be inclined to see a specialist to have their 
problem resolved first through the cheaper channel of 
primary care. Overall, encouraging patients to seek 
primary care instead of specialty care is demon-
strably cost effective. For example, it costs less for a 
primary care physician to treat a common illness 
than it would for a specialist to treat the same illness, 
even though the patient’s outcome will be the same. 
Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi & James Macinko, 
Contribution of Primary Care to Health Systems and 
Health, 83 Millbank Q. 457, 473 (2005) (showing this 
effect for pneumonia). Insurers can effectively chan-
nel patients to primary care instead of specialists by 
carefully designing the patient’s financial obligation 
for each kind of visit through cost sharing and also by 
refusing to reimburse at all for a specialty visit 
absent a referral from a primary care doctor. Again, 
these gatekeepers are not as common among private 
insurers as medical necessity review, and traditional 
Medicare does not require primary care visits at all 
before reimbursing for specialty care. This added 
feature of insurance is merely available for patients 
who freely choose cheaper insurance, like Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), on the private 
market. Regardless, gatekeeping is an efficiency fea-
ture that is quite difficult for self-insured patients to 
capture, and it bolsters the rationality of Congress’s 
decision to shift patients into the insurance market. 
 In sum, the insured market not only corrects for 
the inefficiencies experienced by the self-insured 
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market, but also it provides additional efficiencies 
that help drive down costs for patients while provid-
ing them with more effective care. 
 Congress’s chosen approach to eliminating the 
market for self-insured healthcare transactions is not 
just rational; it is quite elegant. The broader health-
care marketplace operates best when most patients 
purchase care through insurance contracts, which use 
cost-sharing designs and oversight mechanisms to 
correct individual patients’ cognitive failures and 
information asymmetries. By creating a legal incen-
tive for patients to choose third-party insurance over 
self-insurance, Congress will not only steer patients 
out of the inefficient market for self-insured care but 
also steer patients into the significantly more effi-
cient market for fully-insured care. The end is legiti-
mate; the means are rational; and the provision is 
constitutional. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we urge this Court to 
reverse the Eleventh Circuit and direct entry of 
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judgment for the petitioners on the constitutional 
validity of the minimum coverage provision. 
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